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Note
Tweeting the Police: Balancing Free Speech and
Decency on Government-Sponsored Social Media
Pages
Alysha L. Bohanon*
Imagine that you are the police chief for a small suburban
city in the Midwest. The department is considering launching
an official Facebook page, where members of the community
can receive updates on police business and new city ordinances,
read about crime alerts or big cases solved, and interact with
the department through public comments or private messages.
You and your officers believe the page could improve community relations by connecting with citizens and showcasing
the beneficial work the department does, especially during a
1
time of widespread outrage at police departments. But you are
* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. I would
like to thank Professor Heidi Kitrosser for her expertise and thoughtful comments throughout this process. Thanks also to Mary Heath, Kristin McGaver,
Molly Malloy, Matt Hart, and Cassandra Fenton, as well as the editors and
staff members of Minnesota Law Review for their work on this Note and all of
Volume 101. Most importantly, thanks to my family and friends, and especially to my parents for their unwavering support in law review, law school, and
everything else. Copyright © 2016 by Alysha L. Bohanon.
1. Fatal police shootings of unarmed civilians—most frequently, young
black men—have sparked widespread riots, the Black Lives Matter social justice movement, and ongoing national debate over police use of deadly force. As
of this writing, 776 people have been shot and killed by police in the United
States in 2016. See Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost
.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016 (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). In
2015, police fatally shot nearly 1000 civilians. See 991 People Shot Dead by Police in 2015, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/
police-shootings (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). One in ten of these civilians were
unarmed. See id. Although black men make up only six percent of the U.S.
population, they accounted for forty percent of the unarmed men fatally shot
by police in 2015. See id.; Kimberly Kindy, Marc Fisher, Julie Tate, & Jennifer
Jenkins, A Year of Reckoning: Police Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH. POST
(Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/wp/2015/12/
26/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000; see also
Paul D. Shinkman, Outrage at Police Could Bring Return of Dark Ages of
Crime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/
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concerned about maintaining editorial control of your page, especially after a glance at the Minneapolis Police Department’s
2
Facebook page reveals numerous hostile, racist, spammy, and
off-topic comments. A crime update about a robbery, posted by
the Minneapolis Police Department, quickly devolved in the
comments section to name-calling and a heated argument
about guns, race, and the Black Lives Matter movement: “You
can’t arrest them there [sic] Black!! Isn’t that right ‘black lives
3
matter’”; “Shocker, black suspect. Lets [sic] hope they get
4
themselves shot”; “I can’t help it that you’re too much of a
libtard to understand any intention that doesn’t meet your fac5
tual vortex libtard agenda. DERP.” Another post from a citizen
discussing a theft from her mailbox was quickly taken off-topic
by a commenter: “We are fucking shit up today! LET’S START
6
A RIOT! FUCK THE POLICE! #Justice4Jamar.”
You worry excessively hateful, racist, or potentially inciting comments like these will distract from the message you
want to send and prevent productive discourse. You wonder:
How much control will you have to moderate posts and delete
those you find inappropriate without violating the commenters’
First Amendment right to free expression?
news/articles/2014/12/23/outrage-at-police-could-return-cities-to-dark-ages-of
-crime (“‘It’s us versus them.’ That’s been a repeated refrain from protesters,
police officers, experts in law enforcement behavior and some top leaders, in
the wake of several incidents of unarmed people dying at the hands of police,
followed by an armed man killing two NYPD officers. The tone of frustration
from both sides reflects a growing sense of nationwide disenfranchisement between police departments and the communities they are tasked to protect.”).
2. This Note will use “spammy” to describe social media posts and comments that constitute Internet spam. Spam includes, among other things, unwanted advertising, phishing, malicious links, or fraudulent reviews.
3. Mitchell Paul, Comment to Post by the Minneapolis Police Department, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://www.facebook.com/
MinneapolisPoliceDepartment. For an explanation of the fatal police shooting
in Minneapolis that spurred these comments, see Dana Ford, Eliott C.
McLaughlin, & Ray Sanchez, Jamar Clark Death: Protesters Rally After No
Charges Filed Against Police, CNN (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/
03/30/us/minneapolis-jamar-clark-police-shooting-no-charges/index.html.
4. Brandon Swart, Comment to Post by the Minneapolis Police Department, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://www.facebook.com/
MinneapolisPoliceDepartment.
5. Monica Christine, Comment to Post by the Minneapolis Police Department, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://www.facebook.com/
MinneapolisPoliceDepartment.
6. Cliff McCoy, Comment to Review by Jeannette Chapman, Minneapolis
Police Department, FACEBOOK (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/
MinneapolisPoliceDepartment.
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The answer: good question. Despite the prevalence of government social media pages, current First Amendment jurisprudence provides no clear rule.
It is increasingly common for public entities to enter the
social media realm. Just as the Internet and new platforms of
communication have revolutionized the way the public interacts with one another, they have similarly transformed how the
government communicates with its constituents, and vice ver7
sa. Government entities ranging from the White House,
8
9
NASA, and the Pentagon all the way down to the smallest
branches of local government increasingly rely on their social
media pages to inform and interact with the public in various
ways, including policy blogs, behind-the-scenes photos and vid10
eos, emergency notifications, and severe weather alerts. These
posts can attract a wide range of comments from constituents,
which can lead to clashes between government and private ex11
pression interests.
When posts are truly vulgar and offensive, are the user’s
speech interests even worth protecting? From a constitutional
standpoint, if the posts fall within the purview of the First
Amendment, then they must be protected from government
12
censorship. Freedom of expression is a universal human right,
and this protection does not wither when speech is tasteless,
13
trivial, or objectionable. This protection for offensive speech is
7. The White House, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse
(last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
8. NASA, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/NASA (last visited Oct.
23, 2016).
9. Pentagon Force Protection Agency, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook
.com/PentagonForceProtectionAgency (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
10. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis Government, FACEBOOK, https://www
.facebook.com/cityofminneapolis (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (using social media
page to update followers about, among other things, community programming,
snow emergencies, road closures, and the adoptable “Pet of the Week”).
11. See Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Does the First Amendment
Protect Violent Ranting on Facebook?, CONST. DAILY (June 2, 2015), http://blog
.constitutioncenter.org/2015/06/constitution-check-does-the-first-amendment
-protect-violent-ranting-on-facebook (“The growth of the digital world has generated a lengthening list of questions about how far free expression should be
allowed to remain free in the ubiquitous forums of the Internet.”).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
13. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at
19 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
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especially strong in the United States, where “[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disa14
greeable.”
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether the
First Amendment protects private social media users when
they comment on a government-sponsored page. Courts considering the First Amendment implications of social media in other contexts have recognized that social media posts from pri15
vate individuals can constitute protected speech. But when a
user comments on a government-sponsored page, the issue is
more complex. In this case, the level of protection the First
Amendment provides to the speech depends on the extent to
which the social media page is categorized as a public forum,
and whether the private speech posted on this forum prevents
16
the government from speaking for itself. Courts use the public
forum and government speech doctrines to solve comparable is-

seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”). Defining what is offensive is also inherently subjective:
What is “controversial” varies according to circumstances, and just
because it is controversial does not make it “bad”—sometimes a controversial statement is precisely what’s needed to push conversations
in productive directions. . . .
[Controversial speech] must nevertheless be vigorously defended,
not just because of the moral imperative to protect free speech—a
fundamental human right—but also because to do otherwise would
open the doors for further restrictions, not just on “bad” speech but on
“good” speech as well.
Asma Uddin, Even Controversial Views Should Be Protected by Freedom of
Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (July 6, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
asma-uddin/free-speech-protection-fo_b_563729.html.
14. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[A] function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship or
punishment . . . . There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view.” (citations omitted)).
15. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding
that “liking” a political candidate’s Facebook page constitutes political speech
protected under the First Amendment) (“On the most basic level, clicking on
the ‘like’ button literally causes to be published the statement that the User
‘likes’ something, which is itself a substantive statement.”).
16. See infra Part I.A.
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sues involving both private and governmental parties with offline expression, but these doctrines are notoriously difficult to
17
apply.
This Note explores the extent to which government entities
can control and censor private speech posted on governmentsponsored social media websites, such as comments on a city
police department’s Facebook page or a federal agency’s Twitter
feed. Part I sets forth the foundations of the public forum and
government speech doctrines, and discusses the governmentversus-private speech dichotomy these doctrines create in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Part II analyzes governmentsponsored social media as speech under both of the doctrines,
exploring the significant limitations in categorizing speech in
an online government forum as either purely private or purely
government speech. Part III presents a solution that, although
especially attuned to speech on social media pages, is designed
18
to fit both traditional and online speech. Although other commenters have called for a middle category for contested
19
speech, this Note proposes that before reaching this middle
category, courts should first determine whether the private and
government speech within the forum are sufficiently distinct to
receive separate First Amendment protections. This framework
affords the strongest protection to private speech while respecting the government’s interest in speaking for itself.
I. EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF EXISTING FIRST
AMENDMENT DOCTRINES: PUBLIC FORUM,
GOVERNMENT SPEECH, AND RECENT FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Although government-sponsored social media pages are a
relatively recent development, the difficulty in distinguishing
and adequately protecting expression with conflicting speech
interests is a much older dilemma. This Part first describes the
existing framework for categorizing speech in a government
17. See infra Part I.
18. This Note will use the term “traditional speech” to mean offline speech
by private parties or the government that courts have analyzed under First
Amendment doctrine, such as the spoken and written word, print and electronic media, and creative works.
19. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is
Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008) (proposing a
separate middle category for “mixed speech” to receive intermediate scrutiny).
This Note will use the phrase “contested speech” to refer to speech claimed by
both the government and private speakers.
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setting and determining the level of First Amendment protection to afford it, using the public forum doctrine and the government speech doctrine. It then explains how the Supreme
Court has applied these doctrines in recent First Amendment
cases where both government and private parties lay expressive claim to the same speech.
A. DOCTRINES RECOGNIZING PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT
SPEECH INTERESTS
When speech occurs in a government setting, such as on
public property or through a government sponsorship or subsidy, the degree of First Amendment protection provided to the
speech depends on whether the speaker is private or govern20
mental. The Supreme Court recognizes that some government
property or largesse effectively constitute forums in which pri21
vate individuals may speak. When the Court concludes that a
private person has spoken on government property or with government funds, the Court asks what kind of a forum that property or largesse comprised in order to determine the level of
22
First Amendment protection the speech should receive. This
principle is known as the public forum doctrine: the more open
and accessible the property is to the public, the fewer limitations the government may place on private expression within
23
the forum. Meanwhile, if the government is characterized as
speaking—even if the literal speaker is a private person—the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment does not apply to
24
protect any private speech interests. This principle is known

20. See Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech
and Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (2004) [hereinafter Compelled Speech]. Speech from an entity other than the government
is considered private. Id. When private entities speak from private property
(as opposed to in a government setting), they receive the strictest form of First
Amendment protection.
21. See infra Part I.A.1.
22. See infra Part I.A.1.
23. See generally Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975
(2011) (detailing the public forum doctrine and the level of First Amendment
protection provided to each category).
24. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009)
(“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it
does not regulate government speech. A government entity has the right to
‘speak for itself.’ . . . Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could
function if it lacked this freedom.” (citations omitted)); Johanns v. Livestock
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (stating that the government’s own
speech is “exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”).
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25

as the government speech doctrine. This Section will explain
the public forum and government speech doctrines in greater
depth.
1. The Public Forum Doctrine
There is widespread confusion regarding how many categories of forums actually exist within the public forum doctrine.
Courts and academics vary between finding two and four cate26
gories, and the names of the middle levels are not consistent.
This Note will describe all four potential categories: traditional
public forums, designated public forums, limited public forums,
and nonpublic forums.
a. Traditional Public Forums
The first category is the traditional public forum, or the
27
“quintessential” town square. This includes a public street,
park, or sidewalk, but is limited to physical property owned by
the government that has “by long tradition or by government
28
fiat” been “devoted to assembly and debate.” Because of the
extensive history of freedom of speech and public assembly in
these forums, the government’s ability to limit such activity is
29
sharply circumscribed. Any content-based exclusion imposed
by the government receives strict scrutiny: it must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest,” and it must be nar30
rowly drawn to meet that purpose. Thus, a restriction based
on the content of the expression carries a very heavy burden.

25. See infra Part I.A.2.
26. Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 653–54 (2010) (“It is a bad sign if the doctrine is so
confused that reasonable observers cannot even agree on how many categories
of forum exist.”).
27. John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2015) (“The quintessential city park . . . reflects our ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ The city government owns and
manages the land and the physical structures built upon it. But within this
space, anyone can say almost anything. Skaters, vagabonds, hipsters, Klansmen, lesbians, Christians, and cowboys—the city park accommodates them all.
The city park thus symbolizes a core feature of a democratic polity: the freedom of all citizens to express their views in public spaces free from the constraints of government-imposed orthodoxy.” (footnotes omitted)).
28. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); see also Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1981–83.
29. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
30. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
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The state may, however, enforce reasonable, content-neutral
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression, if
such regulations are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest and leave open ample alternative means of
31
expression. Traditional public forums receive the strictest protections for speech and assembly, but they are limited to historically open public spaces—seemingly off-limits to any modern
32
development, including social media pages.
b. Designated (Open) Public Forums
Even if a forum is not historically open (as the traditional
public forum category requires), governments may create, or
33
designate, a public forum as a place for expressive activity.
Examples of designated public forums include municipal thea34
ters and meeting rooms at state universities. Creating a designated public forum requires a clear indication of the government’s intent to open a nontraditional forum to the public:
“[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or
35
by permitting limited discourse . . . .” To find intent, courts
may look to the “policy and practice of the government,” whether the property was “designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities,” or whether the property possesses “the characteris36
tics of a traditional public forum.”
A designated public forum is open to the general public and
operates as a traditional public forum, with very similar First
Amendment protections: “[r]easonable time, place, and manner
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003)
(“The doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to
situations where such history is lacking.”); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (holding that airport terminals are
not traditional public forums because “given the lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of mind’ been held in the public
trust and used for purposes of expressive activity. . . . Thus, the tradition of
airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been
made available for speech activity” (citation omitted)); see also Lidsky, supra
note 23, at 1983.
33. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
34. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989) (public stage
facility); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981) (public university facility); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975) (municipal theater).
35. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985).
36. Id. at 802–03.
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regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state inter37
est.” The key constitutional difference between designated
public forums and traditional public forums comes not in the
regulations, but in the operation of the forum itself: “[a]lthough
a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character
of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same
38
standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” In other
words, the government cannot make content-based restrictions
on speech without meeting strict scrutiny as long as the designated forum is open, but it may completely close the forum if it
wishes.
c. Limited Public Forums
A limited public forum is also designated as public by the
39
government, but only for a limited purpose. This may include
use by only certain groups, or for the discussion of only certain
40
subjects. Thus, the government may impose some contentbased restrictions in order to define and enforce the limits of
speech allowed in the limited public forum, so long as these
41
limits are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. However, “[t]he

37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1983 n.40.
38. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; accord Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also
Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1984 n.46.
39. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1984. The limited public forum, now a massive element of the doctrine (and a source of great frustration), finds its roots
in a scant footnote from the Supreme Court’s decision in Perry. Id. at 1983–84.
The opinion states, “The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to
create the forum in the first place.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46. This sentence
was followed by a footnote: “A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects.”
Id. at 46 n.7 (citation omitted). The ambiguity of the Perry decision’s seventh
footnote is emblematic of the public forum doctrine itself: “[i]t is unclear
whether there is a single middle forum category, several subcategories, or
whether a forum can be designated one way for one class of speakers and another way for others.” Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1984 n.48 (quoting Note, Strict
Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2142 (2009)); see also
Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the
phrase limited public forum “has been used as a synonym for the term ‘designated public forum’ and also for the phrase ‘nonpublic forum.’” (citing Ridley v.
Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004))).
40. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
41. See Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661, 679 (2010); Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1988–89.
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State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not ‘rea42
sonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’”
The line between designated open forums and limited pub43
lic forums is notably blurry. The distinction depends on the
government’s intent in creating the forum: Did the state intend
to create a “designated” open public forum that operates as a
traditional public forum, or did it intend to establish a designated but “limited” public forum in which the government re44
tains more control over expressive activity? A frequent critique of the limited public forum is that it is heavily deferential
to the government imposing the restriction—for all practical
purposes, it is difficult to distinguish a discriminatory contentbased restriction from a viewpoint-neutral shaping of the forum’s subject matter parameters, especially when the constitu45
tional standard is reasonableness.
d. Nonpublic Forums
The final forum category is the nonpublic forum. This kind
of government property includes military bases, airport termi46
nals, and a public school’s internal mail system. Here, the
government’s rights are similar to those of a private property
owner, and it retains significant control over expressive activi47
ties in the forum. As in a public forum, the government can

42. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
43. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299, 300 (2009) (“Substantial confusion exists regarding
what distinction, if any, exists between a ‘designated public forum’ and a ‘limited public forum.’”).
44. See Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Government Sponsored Social Media and Public Forum Doctrine Under the First Amendment: Perils and Pitfalls, 19 PUB.
LAW, Summer 2011, at 2, 4 (2011).
45. See Caplan, supra note 26, at 653 (“The ability of the government to
select its own constitutional standard is another chief criticism lodged against
the public forum doctrine. Why should the government be able to will away a
speech-protective constitutional rule simply by intending that it not apply?”
(footnote omitted)).
46. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674
(1992) (airport terminals); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983) (public school internal mail system); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 830 (1976) (military base).
47. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (“[The] First Amendment does not guarantee
access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.” (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453
U.S. 114, 129 (1981))).
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make reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. In
nonpublic forums, the government may also exclude a speaker
as long as the exclusion is “reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
49
speaker’s view” —a much looser standard than the strict scru50
tiny used for a traditional or designated open public forum. In
practice, however, there is very little difference between a non51
public and a limited public forum. Both require viewpoint
neutrality, and state-imposed exclusions are judged according
52
to a reasonableness standard. Some commentators suggest
the difference between the two categories may stem from semantics: perhaps a judge will apply the reasonableness inquiry
with greater force to a limited public forum, yet approach the
same inquiry in a nonpublic forum with deference to the gov53
ernment.
The doctrine used to assess the First Amendment protections afforded to private speech in a public forum is thus difficult to apply, as the lines distinguishing the forums—however
54
many there are—are blurry. This application is increasingly
complicated when government speech is involved.
2. The Government Speech Doctrine
The other category of speech, which is considered wholly
apart from private speech (and the public forum doctrine), is
speech made by the government. The Supreme Court has recognized that the government has a substantial interest in pro55
moting its own programs. This recognition resulted in the
government speech doctrine, a fairly recent legal development
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 45.
51. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1990 (“The line between the designated
‘limited’ public forum and the nonpublic forum is maddeningly slippery, and
some would even say non-existent, notwithstanding their linguistically opposed labels.”).
52. See id. at 1991; supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., id. at 1991–92, 1991 n.109 (suggesting the reasonableness
inquiry is more likely to be applied with “bite” to a limited public forum than
to a nonpublic forum).
54. See Lidsky, supra note 44, at 3 (noting the public forum doctrine was
“‘virtually impermeable to common sense’ even before the internet came along”
(quoting ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 199 (1995))).
55. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“[W]hen the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define
the limits of that program.”).
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that gives the government wide leeway to convey its own mes56
sages. In some circumstances, this leeway includes accepting
speech from some private entities while excluding others with
57
conflicting views. The recourse for such exclusion lies not in
the First Amendment, but in the political process: the Supreme
Court has reasoned that the government is ultimately accountable to voters for its speech, and voters can elect new officials if
58
they object to the government’s advocacy.
The government speech doctrine is used as a defense
against speech restrictions, even those based on viewpoint, on
the basis that the government may choose exactly what it
wishes to say, including when it commissions private individu59
als to speak on its behalf. In its current form, this relatively
new doctrine creates a strict dichotomy between contested
speech being governmental or private: either the public forum
doctrine (if speech is private) or the government speech doctrine (if speech is characterized as the government’s) can apply,
60
but not both. It is hardly surprising that the government’s in56. Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 904 (2010) (stating that the government speech doctrine
“insulates the government’s own speech from First Amendment challenges by
plaintiffs who seek to alter or join that expression”).
57. See Compelled Speech, supra note 20, at 2415.
58. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563 (2005)
(“[Government messages] are subject to political safeguards more than adequate to set them apart from private messages.”); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001) (“The latitude which may exist for restrictions on speech where the government’s own message is being delivered
flows in part from our observation that, ‘[w]hen the government speaks, for
instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If
the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different
or contrary position.’” (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000))); see also Lidsky, supra note 44, at 5.
For a criticism of this method of recourse, see Norton & Citron, supra note 56,
at 909–10 (arguing that political accountability mechanisms provide no meaningful safeguard when the government is not required to identify itself as the
speaker).
59. Or, in some cases, when plaintiffs claim their speech was compelled by
the government. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562 (involving beef producers claiming a compelled-subsidy program targeted at the beef industry violated their
First Amendment rights). See generally Compelled Speech, supra note 20 (discussing the relationship between government speech and compelled speech
doctrines).
60. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (stating that the case centers on whether the government was engaging in its own
expressive conduct or providing a forum for private speech); see also Johanns,
544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The government-speech doctrine is
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terest in speaking for itself is often in tension with its obligation to respect free speech when individuals convey their own
messages on government property or through government subsidies.
a. The Creation of the Government Speech Doctrine: The Rust
Framework
Although the Supreme Court never mentioned the term
61
“government speech” in its opinion in Rust v. Sullivan, the
case is widely considered the fountainhead of government
62
speech jurisprudence. Rust involved federal regulations barring providers at family planning clinics that received federal
funds under Title X of the Public Service Health Act from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, advocacy, or other abor63
tion-related expression. Even if a pregnant woman specifically
requested it, a Title X doctor could not refer her to an abortion
64
provider. Suing on behalf of themselves and their patients, Title X grantees and doctors contended the regulations violated
the First Amendment by imposing conditions on the funds that
65
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. The law, the plaintiffs
argued, impermissibly discriminated against all expression related to abortion, even neutral and accurate information, while
compelling providers to communicate with pregnant women in
66
a manner that promoted carrying the pregnancy to term. In a
five-to-four decision, the majority held that the government
was entitled to fund a program that advanced certain goals (to
the exclusion of others) without violating the First Amend67
ment.
relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise.”).
61. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
62. See, e.g., Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (identifying Rust as a government
speech case); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833 (1995) (“[In Rust, we] recognized that when the government appropriates
public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what
it wishes.”); Norton & Citron, supra note 56 (“The Supreme Court identifies
Rust v. Sullivan as the beginning of its government speech jurisprudence.”).
63. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179–80.
64. Id. at 180. Doctors were directed to respond to such a request by informing the patient, “the [Title X] project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for
abortion.” Id.
65. Id. at 192.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 194 (“When Congress established a National Endowment for
Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was
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In a spirited dissent, Justice Blackmun characterized the
regulations as impermissibly content-based, viewpoint-based,
and intended to suppress “dangerous ideas” by manipulating
the most private of conversations: “the very words spoken to a
68
woman by her physician.”
Although the Court in Rust did not expressly classify the
regulations as government speech, the decision supports the
notion that the government is entitled to establish limits for its
own programs, even at the expense of otherwise-private speech,
69
without violating the First Amendment.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions characterized the
regulations at issue in Rust as government speech and identi70
fied the opinion as creating the “Rust framework.” Under the
Rust framework, the only question to be determined is one of
71
fact: Who is speaking? If the speech is private speech taking
place in a public forum, it is subject to analysis under the public forum doctrine. This is true regardless of any government
interest in the content of the expression. If the government is
speaking, however, the government speech doctrine applies, for
the government is “‘entitled to say what it wishes’ in promoting
its policies, regardless of the effect that such speech may have
72
on private parties.” This framework creates the strict dichotomy between governmental and private speech.
b. An Evolving Doctrine: Subsequent Case Law
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Supreme Court
confronted a similar subsidy program to that in Rust but
73
reached the opposite result. In Velazquez, Congress subsidized
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) organizations to provide free
not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines
of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” (citation omitted)).
68. Id. at 209–11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“This type of intrusive, ideologically based regulation of speech . . . cannot be justified simply because it is
a condition upon the receipt of a governmental benefit.”).
69. See id. at 194, 196.
70. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The
Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech;
when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust
on this understanding.”); see also Compelled Speech, supra note 20 (explaining
the Rust framework).
71. Compelled Speech, supra note 20.
72. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995)).
73. 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001).
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legal assistance for indigent clients seeking welfare benefits,
but prohibited such organizations from representing clients in
ways that attempted to amend or otherwise challenge existing
74
welfare law. Thus, LSC-funded attorneys could not argue to a
court that a state statute conflicted with a federal statute, or
75
that either statute violated the Constitution. LSC attorneys
and their indigent clients claimed the funding restriction violated the First Amendment and was intended to discourage
76
challenges to the status quo.
The Court found that the funding condition was an uncon77
stitutional viewpoint-based restriction on private speech. Distinguishing the case from Rust, the Court reasoned that the
LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech (the attorneys speaking on their clients’ behalf), not to promote a gov78
ernment message. The Court determined the restriction
“sift[ed] out cases presenting constitutional challenges in order
79
to insulate the Government’s laws from judicial inquiry.” Unsympathetic to the government’s argument that it was ensuring its funds were used within the limits of the program it created, the Court stated: “Congress cannot recast a condition on
funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest
the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exer80
cise.”
In Velazquez, the Court shaped the government speech
doctrine by recognizing the differences between governmentfunded programs wherein (1) the government is itself the
speaker (a clear case of government speech, where the government has “virtually boundless discretion to say what it wish81
es” ); (2) the government uses private speakers to transmit
specific information about government programs (as in Rust,
where the government speech doctrine applies); and (3) the
government funds a program intended to facilitate private
speech, not promote a government message (as in Velazquez,
where the First Amendment, not the government speech doc-

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 537, 539.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 542–43.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 547.
Compelled Speech, supra note 20.
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82

trine, applies). In practice, however, these distinctions can be
a difficult pill to swallow with the factual similarities between
83
Velazquez and Rust.
The final government speech ruling discussed in this Section comes from the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in
84
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum. The issue in the case was
whether monuments donated by private entities in a city park
constituted government speech, or private speech in a public
85
forum. The park contained fifteen monuments, including a
Ten Commandments monument that was donated by a reli86
gious organization in 1971. Summum, another religious organization, requested permission to donate a religious monu87
ment of its own, but the city refused. Summum sued the city,
claiming Pleasant Grove violated its First Amendment rights
by refusing to accept its monument in a traditional public fo88
rum. The Court was forthright in its decision that the monuments were government speech: “There may be situations in
which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is
speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private
89
speech, but this case does not present such a situation.” The
Court reasoned that the permanence of the monument and the
82. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541–42. The Velazquez Court relied on a number of limited public forum cases in its opinion, and it recognized the similarities between the subsidy in this case and limited public forums:
When the government creates a limited forum for speech, certain restrictions may be necessary to define the limits and purposes of the
program. The same is true when the government establishes a subsidy for specified ends. As this suit involves a subsidy, limited forum
cases . . . [involving government property] may not be controlling in a
strict sense, yet they do provide some instruction.
Id. at 543–44 (citations omitted). This reasoning suggests that despite the
government’s speech interests, the Court treated the LSC program as analogous to a limited public forum, with the speech restriction failing because it
was not reasonable in light of the nature of the program and/or not viewpoint
neutral. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
83. See infra Part II.B.3.
84. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
85. Id. at 467 (“The parties’ fundamental disagreement thus centers on
the nature of petitioners’ conduct when they permitted privately donated
monuments to be erected in Pioneer Park. Were petitioners engaging in their
own expressive conduct? Or were they providing a forum for private speech?”).
86. Id. at 464–65.
87. Id. at 465. Pleasant Grove stated that it only accepted monuments
that directly related to the history of the city, or were donated by organizations with long-standing ties to the Pleasant Grove community. Id.
88. Id. at 466.
89. Id. at 470.
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limited space available meant that the public was likely to at90
tribute the monument’s message to the government. Thus, because the government speech doctrine allows the government to
choose its own speech and message, it was permissible for the
city to accept some privately donated monuments but reject
91
others without violating the First Amendment.
Summum demonstrates the pragmatic underpinnings of
the government speech doctrine: if the Court had reached the
opposite result, a government who accepted privately donated
art would have to accept a similar donation from any other pri92
vate organization. Using this logic, the Court noted, the United States would have had to either reject France’s gift of the
Statue of Liberty in 1884, or provide a comparable location in
the harbor of New York for similar statues from other coun93
tries. The Court determined it was impractical to rule that the
statues were private speech in a public forum: if public parks
were required to either accept all donated monuments or refuse
them all, parks would surely be forced to refuse all donations.
As the Court stated, “[W]here the application of forum analysis
would lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvi94
ous that forum analysis is out of place.”
Not all cases involving a clash of First Amendment doctrines lead to such an “obvious” conclusion. The current dichotomous approach to categorizing contested speech requires
courts to disregard the interests of a speaker with a stake in
95
the message, either the private party or government entity,
without a predictable or transparent method for balancing
96
those interests. A court can decide contested speech belongs to
the government without analyzing what government interests
are at play, or why those interests outweigh those of the private

90. Id. at 470–71, 479.
91. Id. at 481.
92. Id. at 479–80.
93. Id. at 479.
94. Id. at 480.
95. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 608 (“Classifying mixed speech as purely
private or purely governmental masks the competing interests at play. Once
mixed speech is labeled government speech, the free speech interests of speakers and audiences are dismissed. Likewise, once mixed speech is labeled private, concerns about state endorsement of offensive, harmful, or religious
speech are ignored.”).
96. See id. at 625–27 (discussing the current framework’s lack of clear
Supreme Court guidance in the case of mixed speech).
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97

speaker. Further, the current framework does not contemplate that both doctrines could be applied to separate speech
98
occurring in the same forum.
The inability of the doctrines to accommodate speech
claimed by both private and government entities is a significant
limitation, both for traditional speech as well as governmentsponsored social media. Recent jurisprudence further highlights this flaw.
B. RECENT FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: MAINTAINING
THE EXPANSIVE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IN WALKER
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. is the most recent Supreme Court case involving government and private entities laying expressive claim to the same
99
speech. In Walker, the Court considered whether Texas’s specialty license plate program constitutes private or government
100
speech. The program allows private individuals, organizations, and nonprofits to submit license plate design proposals to
101
the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board. If the Board
102
approves the design, the state produces the plate. In 2009,
the Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV)
proposed a specialty plate design featuring a Confederate battle
103
flag, which the Board rejected. SCV sued, arguing the Board
unconstitutionally discriminated based on viewpoint by refus104
ing to approve the design.
The majority opinion relied on Rust and Summum to determine that the specialty license plates conveyed government
speech, not private; thus, the government speech doctrine applied, and the restriction was not subject to analysis under the
105
public forum doctrine. Similar to the Court’s analysis of the
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums:
First Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on Government
Websites, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1981, 2028–29 (2010) (explaining that the government speech doctrine assumes—wrongly, in the case of online, interactive
speech—that discourse between the government and citizens is asynchronous:
the government speaks, and the public listens).
99. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
100. Id. at 2243–44.
101. Id. at 2244.
102. Id. at 2244–45.
103. Id. at 2245.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 2245–50 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.
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park in Summum, the Walker Court noted a long history of
communicating governmental messages on license plates, and
determined that the public was likely to attribute the speech to
106
the government. The Court surmised this was part of the
draw for specialty plates in the first place: to give the appear107
ance of the government’s approval with the message. Finally,
again comparing the case to Summum, the Court found that
Texas “effectively controlled” the messages conveyed on its specialty plates by exercising final approval authority and reject108
ing at least a dozen proposed plates. Thus, the Court determined that Texas was entitled to refuse to issue plates with
109
SCV’s Confederate flag design.
The dissent accused the majority opinion of “pass[ing] off
private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establish[ing] a precedent that threatens private speech that gov110
ernment finds displeasing.” Illustrating the high stakes in
the government-versus-private speech dichotomy, the dissent
wrote that the Court’s decision “categorizes private speech as
government speech and thus strips it of all First Amendment
111
protection.”
As Walker illustrates, the Supreme Court is still grappling
with the divide between private and government speech, but
the government speech doctrine remains expansive. The stakes
of the first step of the Rust framework are exceedingly high,
since the doctrine cannot accommodate simultaneous private
speech while the government is speaking. This doctrinal flaw is
particularly unworkable in the context of governmentsponsored social media pages, which are intended to foster
communication between private and governmental parties.
Discussions on these pages occur in online spaces specifically
designed to accommodate multiple speakers with separate

460 (2009)); id. at 2246 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
106. Id. at 2248.
107. Id. (“Indeed, a person who displays a message on a Texas license plate
likely intends to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that message. If not, the individual could simply display the message in question in
larger letters on a bumper sticker right next to the plate. But the individual
prefers a license plate design to the purely private speech expressed through
bumper stickers. That may well be because Texas’s license plate designs convey government agreement with the message displayed.”).
108. Id. (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 473).
109. Id. at 2253.
110. Id. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 2255.

360

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:341

speech interests, but the Supreme Court’s current framework
for categorizing speech on public property requires courts to
recognize either the government or the private entity as the
speaker, often to the exclusion of the other.
II. THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF APPLYING CURRENT
FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES TO SOCIAL MEDIA
PAGES
As Part I described, the public forum and government
speech doctrines can be difficult to apply. The governmentversus-private speech dichotomy is especially troubling in contested speech cases, as the speaker’s categorization as a government or private entity yields very different First Amendment protections. Part II of this Note highlights and explores
the limitations that arise when both government and private
parties lay expressive claim to the same speech. This Part first
analyzes the competing speech interests in governmentsponsored social media pages if such pages are deemed to constitute public forums. It then follows the same analysis if government-sponsored social media pages constitute government
speech. Finally, this Part discusses scholars’ calls for middle
ground.
A. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SOCIAL MEDIA PAGES UNDER A
PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the fact that private corporations
own social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter does not
preclude a government-sponsored page on that platform from
112
receiving public forum status. Although the government does
not own the page, it is nevertheless likely to be considered public property since the government maintains and largely controls it. This is akin to the government leasing physical property from a private owner: when the government uses a space as
its own, that space will fall under the realm of public property
113
subject to the public forum doctrine.
112. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1996 (“[G]overnment ownership is not a sine
qua non of public forum status . . . . The lack of government ownership or exclusive control of the social media forum it establishes, however, should not
preclude a finding of public forum status. Just as the government can rent a
building to use as a forum for public debate and discussion, so, too, can it ‘rent’
a social media page for the promotion of public discussion.”).
113. Cf. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975) (designating a privately owned theater leased by a city government as a public forum).
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If government-sponsored social media pages constitute
public forums, which category of public forum applies? With the
confusion surrounding the categories themselves, there is no
clear answer. The traditional public forum may be ruled out, as
the Supreme Court has made it clear that the property must be
devoted to the public by long tradition, an impossibility for so114
cial media. The nonpublic forum may also be ruled out, as a
Facebook page inviting public comments on posts is unlike an
airport terminal, a military base, or a federal prison, where
members of the general public are not allowed without an au115
thorized purpose. This leaves the middle categories: the designated public forum or the limited public forum.
Recall that the government’s intent when creating the fo116
rum is key to distinguishing between these middle categories.
A court is likely to consider a government-sponsored social media page as a designated public forum if the site was intended
117
to be open to commentary from all users on all topics, or a
limited public forum if the site was created only for commen118
tary related to a specific purpose. The Court has identified
two factors that courts may consider to determine the government’s intent for creating a forum: the “policy and practice of
the government” with respect to the property, and “the nature
119
of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.”
This Section explores these two factors.
1. The Policy and Practice of Government-Sponsored Social
Media Pages
The Supreme Court has not provided much guidance on
what the “policy and practice of the government” means, but a
120
number of circuits have addressed the issue. The inquiry is
meant to be factual: a court should not simply defer to the gov114. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
115. See Lidsky, supra note 44, at 6 (“[T]he nonpublic forum . . . is characterized by selective access for chosen speakers.”).
116. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
117. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
118. See Lidsky, supra note 44, at 5.
119. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802–03 (1985).
120. See, e.g., Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 78 (1st Cir.
2004); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1152–54
(7th Cir. 1995); Ysleta Fed’n of Teachers v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 720 F.2d
1429, 1433 (5th Cir. 1983).
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ernment’s stated purpose, and “[t]he government may not ‘create’ a policy to implement its newly-discovered [sic] desire to
121
suppress a particular message.” Further, case law supports
the notion that a stated or written policy in the “About” section
of a government’s social media page is not enough to render the
page a limited forum: “[o]bjective indicia of intent are instead
122
more telling in forum analysis.” Thus, a written policy stating
that “abusive” comments will be removed is not the end of the
analysis, and it does not give the government an unfettered li123
cense to delete comments that it determines to be “abusive.”
Because the “policy and practice” factor is intended to be a
factual inquiry, the outcome may depend on the comment moderating policies and practices of individual government entities.
This makes drawing broad conclusions about governmentsponsored social media pages under the public forum doctrine
increasingly difficult. Consider two examples: On one end of the
spectrum are sites like the White House Facebook page, which
includes only a brief description of the page and does not in124
clude a comment policy. Commenters can comment on the
government’s posts, but there is no indication that the govern125
ment responds to them. On the other end of the spectrum are
sites like the University of Minnesota’s Facebook page, which
includes a link to a website owned by the University explaining
126
its comment policy. The link warns that inappropriate or offensive posts are subject to removal, and disclaims any association between the University and comments posted on the
127
page. The University occasionally responds to these com128
ments. Based on a preliminary assessment, these government
121. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 45 F.3d at 1153 (citing Hays Cty. Guardian v.
Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 117–18 (5th Cir. 1992)).
122. Id. at 1154 (citing Stewart v. D.C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1019
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
123. See id. (“A stated or paper policy, without more, does not negate public
forum status.”).
124. See The White House, supra note 7 (“This is the White House page on
Facebook. Comments posted on and messages received through White House
pages are subject to the Presidential Records Act and may be archived. Learn
more at WhiteHouse.gov/privacy.”).
125. Id.
126. Univ. of Minn., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/UofMN (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
127. Facebook House Rules, U. OF MINN., https://www.ur.umn.edu/brand/
requirements-and-guidelines/social-networking/house-rules.php (last visited
Oct. 23, 2016).
128. See Univ. of Minn., supra note 126.

2016]

TWEETING THE POLICE

363

entities have very different policies and practices regarding
their pages. Assuming the University actually enforces its stated policy, the University of Minnesota’s page may be catego129
rized as a limited public forum, whereas the lack of a written
comment policy indicates the White House’s page would likely
130
be a designated open public forum. These different categorizations mean an identical comment on each page could receive
different levels of First Amendment protection, despite the fact
that that both pages are government-sponsored forums on the
same social media platform.
2. The Nature of Government-Sponsored Social Media Pages
and Expressive Activities
The second factor courts can consider to glean governmental intent for creating a forum is “the nature of the property
131
and its compatibility with expressive activity.” This involves
whether it was “designed for and dedicated to expressive activi132
ties” or has “the characteristics of a traditional public forum.”
Given the pervasiveness of social media, this is a point that requires little discussion; it is difficult to imagine a space more
designed for expressive activities. By its very definition, the na133
ture of a social media page is online expression. Governmentsponsored social media pages adopt this open forum atmos134
phere the same as any other page. It has even been suggested
that social media has replaced the quintessential city park as
“the new public square,” as people increasingly participate in
135
discussions related to civic engagement online.

129. See supra Part I.A.1(c).
130. See supra Part I.A.1(b).
131. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802–03 (1985).
132. Id. at 803.
133. Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/social%20media (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (defining social media as
“forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking and
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)”).
134. See, e.g., Governor Mark Dayton & Lieutenant Governor Tina Smith,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/GovMarkDayton (last visited Oct. 23,
2016) (“Governor Mark Dayton’s official Facebook page is an open forum
where anyone with an interest in the State of Minnesota can share information, ask advice, or express responsible, respectful opinions.”).
135. Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social
Networking, and the Unmapped New Public Square, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 95–
96 (2011).
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After considering these two factors, the best-case scenario
for private speakers on a government-sponsored social media
page is the designated public forum, since this category provides essentially the same protections to private speech as a
136
traditional public forum. Arguably, this classification is plausible if both the policy and practice of the government and the
nature of the page are conducive to expressive activities, which
would suggest that the government intended to fully open a
137
nontraditional forum to the public by creating the page.
Although a designated open forum status would best protect private speech interests, there are many uncertainties with
this classification. Even relying strictly on the public forum
doctrine, the factors identified in Cornelius could lead a court to
determine that government-sponsored social media pages fall
into a category with less protection for private speech—namely,
138
the limited public forum. This categorization is troubling in
at least two respects. First, it affords inadequate protection to
private individuals’ speech in the context of a social media
page. Restrictions must merely be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum—a standard that,
in practice, is virtually indistinguishable from that of a nonpublic forum, where the government retains significant control
139
over speech. Courts considering restrictions in limited public
forums also tend to be heavily deferential to the government
140
imposing the restriction, but this practice would undervalue
private speech and run counter to the purpose of social media
pages: open communication.
Second, courts would still need to conduct the factual inquiry based on the Cornelius factors to determine the scope of
the forum, thus opening the door for different governmentsponsored social media pages to be held to different standards
141
under the First Amendment. This adds an additional layer of
uncertainty to the mix for both parties: the government cannot
be certain which standard their restrictions must satisfy (those
136. And, thus, the same protections as private speech in a nongovernment setting. See supra Part I.A.1(b).
137. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
138. Other authors have come to this conclusion. For more discussion on
this point, see Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1998 (determining interactive, government-sponsored social media sites would most likely be considered a limited public forum).
139. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
141. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1998.
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of a designated public forum or of a limited public forum), and
commenters have no way to know how much protection their
speech should receive until after it is removed.
These issues aside, applying solely the public forum doctrine to government-sponsored social media pages under the
current framework is, to put it mildly, unlikely. Recall that the
preliminary question in a contested speech case involving private expression in a government setting is who is speaking: the
142
government or a private party. As one example, consider
again the University of Minnesota’s Facebook page: government actors created the page; wrote the biography and commenting policy; post statuses, photos, videos, and other content;
143
Private
and even interact with commenters on occasion.
144
speech occurs in posts on the page’s “Timeline” or in designated comment sections in response to the government’s
145
posts. Given the government’s clear presence on the page, if a
court was forced to choose between solely private speech on one
hand, or solely government speech (even at the risk of drowning out corresponding private speech) on the other, could it
claim the University’s Facebook page involved no government
speech? In Walker, although private individuals submitted the
license plate designs, the government approved, produced, and
146
sold the designs. The government also regulated the content
that must appear on all plates, such as the numbers, state
name, and registration tabs, and it had a long history of doing
147
so. Despite the presence of some private speech, the Court refused to overlook the government’s undeniable connection to
the plates and categorized the program as solely government
148
This explains the precarious situation of private
speech.
commenters on government-sponsored social media pages under the current framework, which tends to prioritize the gov149
ernment’s interest in speaking.
142. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
143. Univ. of Minn., supra note 126.
144. A “Timeline” is the space on a Facebook page showing posts (such as
statuses, videos, or photos) made by the owner of the page or by other users.
See How Do I Post to My Timeline?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/1462219934017791 (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
145. Id.
146. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2244–45 (2015).
147. See id. at 2248–49.
148. Id. at 2250–51.
149. See Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 916 (“[The Court] simply ap-

366

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:341

3. Benefits and Risks of Classifying Government-Sponsored
Social Media Pages as Private Speech
There are a number of benefits to classifying governmentsponsored social media pages as solely private speech and applying the public forum doctrine. First, the main purpose of social media is to create forums for discussion, community build150
Government actors choose to create
ing, and friendships.
Facebook and other social media accounts for that reason—if
encouraging discussion in a central forum was not the purpose,
governments could opt to create static websites without com151
ment sections. Instead, government agencies moved to Facebook to connect with their constituents, and protecting private
speech is central to promoting this goal.
Categorizing government-sponsored social media pages as
public forums does create issues for the government, however.
As mentioned above, the fact-based inquiry into the government’s policy and practice with the page creates uncertainty for
government page owners, who cannot know for certain how
152
their page will be classified until a judge considers it. Additionally, although allowing comments does not prevent the government from speaking, excessive off-topic or inflammatory
posts may dilute the government’s message, or prevent other
citizens from having a meaningful exchange in the comments.
The government has an interest in keeping its page free from
vulgar, obscene, harassing, or spammy posts, just as an indi153
vidual or entity could do on their own private page. In allowing greater restrictions on private speech, the limited public forum doctrine may address some of these governmental
concerns; however, this categorization is unsatisfactory (even
for government entities) due to the uncertainty it imposes for
154
contested speech.
There is no dispute that a government entity has an inter155
est in speaking, and does speak, on its social media page. Any

pears to defer to the government, as it has yet to deny government’s claim to
contested speech as its own.”).
150. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137,
1142–44 (2009) (defining social network sites).
151. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1996.
152. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
153. Cf. Corbin, supra note 19, at 656–57 (“[T]he harm of certain messages
is exacerbated by the government’s imprimatur.” (footnote omitted)).
154. See supra Part III.A.2.
155. See generally Norton & Citron, supra note 56 (describing the govern-
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reframing of First Amendment doctrine to remove the privateversus-government speech dichotomy would have to adequately
recognize the government’s legitimate interest in speaking,
even amid private speakers.
B. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SOCIAL MEDIA UNDER A
GOVERNMENT SPEECH ANALYSIS
As the previous Section discussed, it is unlikely that a
court would categorize a government-sponsored social media
page as solely private speech, considering the clear government
presence on the page. Following this analysis, this Section applies the government speech doctrine and the Court’s holdings
in Walker and Summum to speech on government-sponsored
social media pages. In doing so, it discusses the significant
harm such an analysis could pose to private speech on government pages. This Section also addresses the impact of pragmatism driving First Amendment jurisprudence.
1. Government-Sponsored Social Media Pages as Solely
Government Speech
When the government speaks, it is entitled to take a position or promote a policy or program, even to the exclusion of
156
other viewpoints. Similar to the information found on a government entity’s own website, a government’s social media
posts are created by the government to convey a particular
157
message. A government’s posts on its own social media page
easily constitute the government speaking for itself, arguably
even more apparently than the license plates in Walker or the
158
statues in Summum. In Walker, the holding rested on whether or not the plates amounted to government expression; when
ment speech doctrine’s relationship with government-sponsored social media
pages).
156. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2246 (2015) (“How could a city government create a successful recycling
program if officials, when writing householders asking them to recycle cans
and bottles, had to include in the letter a long plea from the local trash disposal enterprise demanding the contrary? How could a state government effectively develop programs designed to encourage and provide vaccinations, if officials also had to voice the perspective of those who oppose this type of
immunization?”).
157. See Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 920–25.
158. Cf. id. at 920 (“In our information age, governmental use of networked
technologies to express its views is as valuable as it is necessary. Today, the
efficacy of government expression depends upon government’s use of networked technologies . . . .”).
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the Court determined they did, the government speech doctrine
159
was the only relevant framework to apply. In the context of
government-created social media posts, whether or not the government is speaking is not at issue. Thus, under this framework, a government-sponsored social media page looks like a
textbook case of government speech, and the government need
not worry about violating private commenters’ free speech
160
rights under the First Amendment.
Despite what looks like a straightforward case when
viewed solely under the Rust framework, governmentsponsored social media pages differ from the government
speech at issue in Walker and Summum in several important
ways. First, a driving force of the Walker and Summum decisions was the belief that the public might wrongly attribute
161
messages from private parties to the government. The risk of
this mistaken attribution is not an issue in social media posts,
where the page owner’s speech is larger and more prominent
than that of the commenters. More importantly, the speaker’s
name and profile picture is attached to the message, so there is
162
no confusion as to who is speaking. Further, government page
owners can (and many do) readily attach disclaimers to their
pages, stating that private comments do not reflect the gov163
ernment’s views.
In addition, unlike the park in Summum, social media
164
pages are not limited in space. The Internet provides space to
hold unlimited viewpoints, so the concern about the government being forced to later accept all similar private expression
with limited space does not apply to government-sponsored social media. In Walker, although Texas was not limited in the
number of license plates it could produce, it was limited in the

159. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2252–53.
160. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
161. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
162. Interestingly, this feature of social media resolves one frequent critique of the government speech doctrine—that because the government is not
required to affirmatively identify itself as the source of contested speech, it is
able to escape both First Amendment restrictions and political accountability.
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). For further discussion on this critique, see generally Norton & Citron,
supra note 56.
163. See, e.g., Facebook House Rules, supra note 127 (“Comments posted to
Facebook pages do not represent the opinions of the University of Minnesota.”).
164. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478–80 (2009).
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amount of space on each plate—making a viewpoint disclaimer
on a license plate much less feasible than on a social media
165
page. Further distinguishing Walker, the government does
not generally play a role in accepting or approving private posts
before they are displayed on the page. Requiring an affirmative
action from the government in respect to private speech, such
as approving and producing a license plate, is arguably different from passively allowing it to remain in the comments sec166
tion.
2. Benefits and Risks of Government-Sponsored Social Media
as Government Speech
There are potential benefits, even for private individuals,
to classifying government-sponsored social media as government speech. First, government use of social media to com167
municate with constituents is beneficial for society. Improved
access to information and communication with elected officials
helps build an informed electorate, ensures political accounta168
bility, and ultimately supports the democratic process. Governments are arguably more likely to use social media pages
when they have some protection against violating private
169
speech rights under the First Amendment. This access to information is valuable to citizens, and perhaps it is worth allow-

165. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249–51.
166. Id. at 2251. Some social media sites, such as Facebook, have an optional feature that allows page administrators to block comments that contain
certain words, such as profanity, before they are posted on the page; however,
administrators cannot approve every individual post or comment. See Moderation, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/329858980428740 (select
“How Can I Proactively Moderate Content Published on My Page?”) (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). Although not relevant under a government speech doctrine
analysis, this practice raises additional questions regarding prior restraint
under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975) (discussing the constitutionality of prior restraints
against traditional speech); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963) (same).
167. See Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 939 (“[G]overnment expression
is valuable primarily because it gives the public more information with which
to assess their government.”).
168. Id. at 920.
169. See Ross Rinehart, “Friending” and “Following” the Government: How
the Public Forum and Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Government’s Social Media Presence, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 781 (2013) (discussing the decision of the local government in Redondo Beach, Cal., to abandon its social media presence due to uncertainty of how to manage its social
media page without violating commenters’ First Amendment rights).
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ing government entities greater editorial control over their
170
pages in order to achieve it.
Another important characteristic of a governmentsponsored social media page is that because the government
does not own Facebook, it does not have control over the entire
platform. In Rust, the Court determined the Title X restrictions
against providing information about abortion were permissible
government speech, in part because the patients could receive
171
that information outside of the scope of the program. Facebook pages are similar to this: users who wish to express themselves in a way that conflicts with the focus of a government
entity’s page are free to simply create their own. Although the
user could not take advantage of the government’s audience,
Facebook is a free service that provides equal access to a plat172
form for expression.
These benefits notwithstanding, categorizing governmentsponsored social media as solely government speech would pose
significant risks to the free speech interests of private users.
First, the government’s selective comment editing could distort
the marketplace of ideas to artificially portray a position as
173
more popular than it is. There is no real check on the government’s editing: even if a user notices his or her comment has
been removed, there is very little he or she could do about it.
Thus, the public’s primary recourse for government speech it
disagrees with—political accountability—is significantly un174
dermined. Further, the option for users to create their own
pages does not reduce their interest in speaking on the government’s page: the Supreme Court has held that the mere fact
that a person could speak in some other place does not justify
170. See generally id.
171. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (“Under the Secretary’s
regulations, however, a doctor’s ability to provide, and a woman’s right to receive, information concerning abortion and abortion-related services outside
the context of the Title X project remains unfettered.”); see also Legal Servs.
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546–47 (2001) (distinguishing Rust because
unlike LSC’s indigent clients, a patient in Rust had alternative channels from
which to receive abortion counseling).
172. See Create an Account, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
345121355559712?helpref=page_content (select “Does It Cost Money to Use
Facebook?”) (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
173. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 668–69 (“[A] position perceived as popular is likely to wield greater influence.”).
174. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 663–64 (stating the public’s remedy of
democratic accountability under the government speech doctrine “is only effective so long as reasonable citizens know when the government speaks”).
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175

exclusion from an appropriate forum. As a practical matter,
the option for a separate forum is of very little use when the
message a private individual is trying to convey requires access
to the government’s audience in order to be effective—such as
when a commenter is responding to something the government
posted on its page.
3. Pragmatism as a Driving Force of Contested Speech
Determinations
The current government-versus-private speech dichotomy
allows courts to resolve cases in ways that address pragmatic
concerns, rather than reaching transparent and predictable judicial rulings. The divergent outcomes in Rust and Velazquez
are one example of this pragmatic underpinning. The Court
reasoned in Velazquez that the subsidized speech was not government speech because subsidized attorneys have a profes176
sional obligation to represent the interests of their clients.
The doctors in Rust also had a professional obligation to serve
the interests of their patients; however, the majority there
found that the doctors’ advice to their patients did constitute
177
government speech. These cases introduce a familiar thread
running through government speech cases, and First Amend178
ment doctrines as a whole: pragmatism. Perhaps the Court
found prohibiting all discussion of abortion between a patient
and her doctor palatable under the circumstances, but could
not tolerate leaving indigent LSC clients incapable of challenging welfare laws. In this way, the government speech doctrine
can sometimes function as a safety net for the most objectionable cases—such as forcing the government to produce Confed179
erate flag license plates. But the contrary outcomes in Rust
175. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (“[O]ne is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place.”).
176. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
177. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If the private doctors’ confidential
advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it is
hard to imagine what subsidized speech would not be government speech.”).
178. Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 915 (“To be sure, pragmatism often
drives the Court’s First Amendment doctrine.”); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737,
739 (2002) (“[T]he constitutional law of free speech seems on the whole,
though certainly not in every respect, to be a product of the judges’ (mainly
they are United States Supreme Court Justices) trying to reach results that
are reasonable in light of their consequences.”).
179. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 656–59.
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and Velazquez illustrate the lack of predictability such a system
creates, where speech’s potential harmful consequences are
180
weighed against its expressive value. A structured, transparent method of balancing competing expressive interests could
help avoid the piecemeal, outcome-driven, and unpredictable
results of the government-versus-private speech dichotomy.
C. THE CALL FOR MIDDLE GROUND IN THE PRIVATEGOVERNMENT SPEECH DICHOTOMY
This Note is not the first to call for middle ground between
181
the strict private-versus-government speech dichotomy. Forcing onward with a framework too inflexible to recognize contested speech with joint expressive claims undermines both
private and government speech interests, and encourages
courts to rule based on a pragmatic view of what the “right”
182
outcome should be. This provides no transparent process to
balance the competing interests and instead requires courts to
completely disregard the other, legitimate claim to expres183
sion.
One scholar wrote at length about a potential middle category, in which deadlocked “mixed speech” cases with private
and governmental parties holding equally weighty interests
184
would be subjected to intermediate scrutiny. To satisfy this
standard, restrictions on private expression resulting in viewpoint-based discrimination would be allowed only if the government held an important constitutional interest known to the
public and the restriction on private speech was not broader
than necessary; the government had no alternate means to protect its interest; and private speakers had alternative channels
185
to express their message. Although this Note agrees that a
middle category is necessary, it posits that past authors’ calls
for a softening of the dichotomy have not been nuanced enough
180. For an article in support of conducting a cost-benefit analysis under
the First Amendment, see generally Posner, supra note 178. Cf. Jed
Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 753 (2002) (“[C]ost-benefit
‘reasoning’ in free speech law is unnecessary and unacceptable . . . . It turns
judges into legislators, evaluating pure policy matters under the guise of constitutional review. Worse, it betrays fundamental First Amendment commitments.”).
181. Corbin, supra note 19; see also Lidsky, supra note 23.
182. See supra Part II.B.3.
183. Corbin, supra note 19, at 608.
184. Id. at 675–80.
185. Id. at 675.
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to capture the intricate differences between traditional and
online speech, and have overlooked a preliminary first step that
would better serve both private parties and the government:
Can the audience clearly distinguish between the speakers? The
next Part argues for a new framework that integrates this
question.
III. A SOLUTION TO MAXIMIZE SPEECH PROTECTION:
TREATING SEPARABLE CONTESTED SPEECH IN
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SOCIAL MEDIA
The current one-doctrine-fits-all approach is ill-suited for
any speech to which both private and governmental parties lay
expressive claim, but is particularly troublesome with government-sponsored social media, where the design and function of
popular websites allows the government and its audience to
clearly distinguish between government and private speech.
This Note introduces a framework with which to consider contested speech in these cases. This Part first describes the new
concepts of separable and combined speech. It then explains
how these concepts can be integrated as a preliminary step to
the government-versus-private speech analysis to better protect
both private and government interests. The final Section addresses potential counterarguments.
A. IDENTIFYING SEPARABLE AND COMBINED SPEECH
This Note argues that there are two kinds of speech to
which both private and governmental parties lay expressive
claim: speech originating from a single speaker but involving
186
multiple parties’ interests in expression (combined speech),
and speech occurring in the same space with more than one
187
identifiable speaker (separable speech). Traditional forms of
speech with competing expressive claims largely involve combined speech, where audiences cannot easily separate private

186. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472
(2009); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553–554 (2005). The
Supreme Court viewed the contested speech at issue in these cases as originating from a single speaker, even if multiple parties had expressive interests or
played a role in the donation, design, or selection of the speech.
187. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). This
Note will use “separable speech” to refer to contested speech cases where audiences can distinguish between speakers, and “combined speech” where audiences cannot draw such distinctions.
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188

speech from that of the government. Consider specialty license plates as an example: although a person seeing a “Choose
Life” plate will likely associate the plate with both the government who created it and the driver who chose to attach it to her
car, the plate itself does not distinguish between the competing
189
interests. Other scholars, focusing on traditional and combined forms of speech such as license plates, have thus proposed solutions that deal with the private and government
190
speech interests in the same way. These proposals are overly
broad with regard to separable speech.
Government-sponsored social media pages are a unique
example of separable speech, where the design and functionality of the website draws a distinct line between speech originating from the government actor and comments from private
191
speakers. The posts from the administrator of a Facebook
page (the government entity, in the case of governmentsponsored social media pages) are displayed larger and more
prominently on the entity’s Timeline than are private posts or
192
comments. Users typically must click a link to see more than
two comments—users who are not willing to risk seeing offen193
sive or harmful comments may choose to keep scrolling. Most
importantly, the name and profile picture of the user is attached to each post, making it inescapably clear in most cases
194
whether the government or a private party is speaking. Finally, governments can (and, indeed, many do) include a disclaimer notice in the “About” section of their Timeline, notifying users that views expressed in the comments do not reflect
195
the views of the government entity maintaining the page.
188. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
189. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248–50. Unlike on a social media page, on a
license plate with limited space the government could not easily distinguish
itself from the private speech with a disclaimer notice; indeed, the disclaimer
itself could substantially interfere with the speech.
190. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 675–76.
191. For a demonstration of these features, see, for example, The White
House, supra note 7.
192. Id.
193. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1970) (“[People offended by
speech may] effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”).
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., The United States Department of Justice, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/DOJ/about/?entity_point=page_nav_about_item&tab=page
_info (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (“The Department of Justice is pleased to participate in open, un-moderated forums offered by commercial social networks
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This option is much less feasible in many combined, traditional
speech instances. This Note argues that under these circumstances, there is no reason to treat separable and combined
speech alike, as other authors supporting the creation of a middle category seem to suggest.
B. TAILORING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS TO SEPARABLE
SPEECH
Before applying the blanket intermediate scrutiny other
196
this Note contends that courts
scholars have suggested,
should first determine whether the private and governmental
aspects of the speech can be separated and addressed accordingly. When speech is separable, such as in the case of government-sponsored social media pages, courts should apply the
government speech doctrine to the government’s own posts, but
uphold stronger protections for private speech by categorizing
the comments section as a designated public forum. This solution adequately protects the government’s ability to speak for
itself while preserving the free-flowing marketplace of ideas
with a transparent judicial test.
This separate treatment method would prioritize the protection of private speech over the government’s by restricting
the government’s ability to delete posts it did not create; however, in the case of separable speech on a governmentsponsored social media page, this “imbalance” is in society’s
best interest. This Note contends that fears about a lack of government editorial control of social media pages are overblown.
Although the government does have an interest in maintaining
197
an orderly page free from harassing or vulgar posts, the features of social media naturally address these government concerns. Users can hide messages they do not want to see from
their Timelines, or take the extra step to report an abusive post
sites in order to increase government transparency, promote public participation and encourage collaboration with the department. Please note that the
department does not control, moderate or endorse the comments or opinions
provided by visitors to this site.”). Critics may counter that it would unfairly
burden the government to require or expect them to alter their own speech by
posting a disclaimer. However, this disclaimer is merely an option for government entities who are concerned about mistaken attribution—it is not a requirement, but a way for the government to ensure it can speak for itself. The
same is true for a written comment policy.
196. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 675–80.
197. See Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 920 (explaining the importance
of governmental use of social media to convey government opinions).
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to Facebook. Facebook’s “Community Standards” apply to both
198
private and governmental pages. Crucially, this feature provides an extra layer of protection: because the government does
not own the entire platform, there is a non-governmental third
party providing baseline protection against abusive, obscene, or
199
spammy posts. Arguably, with this extra protection, the government has even less of an interest in editing private speech
on its page: if a post does not violate Facebook’s Community
Standards, which are not constrained by the First Amendment,
it should not be restricted under the government’s standards.
Further, when it comes to deleting demeaning, derogatory,
or harassing posts, the line between a subject-matter restriction and viewpoint discrimination is difficult to distin200
guish. Even if a government entity was to adopt an acrossthe-board ban on profanity, for example, the claim that this ban
is viewpoint neutral incorrectly assumes that all viewpoints
201
can be expressed effectively without swearing. Even a seemingly neutral subject matter-ban can be used to suppress unpopular views, and determining what is offensive, demeaning,
or derogatory is inherently subjective. This distinction should
not be left to government officials.

198. Community
Standards,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). As one example, Facebook’s
Community Standards prohibit direct threats: “We carefully review reports of
threatening language to identify serious threats of harm to public and personal safety. We remove credible threats of physical harm to individuals. We also
remove specific threats of theft, vandalism, or other financial harm.”
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 830–31 (1995) (“[D]iscrimination against one set of views or ideas is but a
subset or particular instance of the more general phenomenon of content discrimination. And, it must be acknowledged, the distinction is not a precise
one.” (citation omitted)); Corbin, supra note 19, at 651 (“[T]he line between
subject-matter discrimination and viewpoint discrimination is slippery and not
always apparent.”).
201. Corbin, supra note 19, at 650–53. As one illustrative example, consider the case Cohen v. California, in which the Supreme Court overturned a
man’s conviction for disturbing the peace. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen was criminally charged for wearing a jacket with the phrase “Fuck the Draft” inside of
a courthouse. Id. at 16. Could Cohen have conveyed the same message as effectively with another phrase? “No to the Draft”? What about “I Dislike the
Draft”? Not according to the majority opinion: “[W]e cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for
banning the expression of unpopular views.” Id. at 26.

2016]

TWEETING THE POLICE

377

Finally, consider again the example of the Minneapolis Police Department’s Facebook page. If government-sponsored social media pages were analyzed solely under the government
speech doctrine, as the Rust framework requires, the government would be free to delete comments to stifle the important
debate happening on the Department’s page in response to recent police shootings of unarmed civilians. Even if the government tried to moderate posts in a viewpoint-neutral way, the
manner in which these views are presented—offensive, crude,
or otherwise—may be equally as important as the views them202
selves. The language a commenter uses reveals a great deal
about the speaker, and adds an additional layer to the debate.
Removing this layer would leave citizens with a skewed view of
the issues. The comments on the Minneapolis Police Department’s Facebook page spurred debate not only about police
conduct, but about the comments themselves: the posts provide
a glimpse at the divisive and polarizing reactions from the pub203
lic. These reactions serve an important purpose in the mar204
ketplace of ideas. The government does have an interest in
maintaining order on its page, but this interest is adequately
served through the page administrator’s ability to control its
own posts on the page; meanwhile, society’s interest in a robust
marketplace of ideas would be greatly undermined if the comments section of the page were deemed government speech.
It should be up to society to determine what discourse it
will accept; it should not be the government’s job to protect its

202. As the Court explained in Cohen:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that
emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.
Id.
203. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
204. Other authors have identified that listeners, not just speakers, have a
First Amendment interest in speech. Applying this approach to posts on government-sponsored social media, not only would the commenter have an interest in speaking, but other individuals viewing the post could have an interest
in accurately receiving the speech, unfiltered by the government. For a discussion of this listener-based approach in the context of employer speech, see
generally Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech
and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016).
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205

people from hurtful, rude, and racist views. It is this Note’s
position that the viler the speech, the more important it is that
society not be shielded from it—the best cure for bad speech is
206
more speech. The government can clarify its own position in
other, more effective channels that do not involve infringing on
private speech rights, such as posting a status, including a disclaimer in the page description, or doing outreach on- or offline
to try to educate the people who hold these harmful or distasteful beliefs. The government can also choose to turn off commenting features on many of its websites. These forms of expression are all clearly within the governments’ speech rights;
removing troubling comments to attempt to sweep the issue
under the rug should not be.
C. A FEW THOUGHTS ON POSSIBLE COUNTERARGUMENTS
Critics may wonder: If the corporate owner of a social media platform can remove abusive comments, what is the practical difference if it is instead the government that clicks “delete”
on the same comment? It may be argued that relying on Facebook to regulate the government’s page only serves to outsource
the same censorship—the user’s speech interests face identical
harm. Viewed from an “ends justify the means” perspective,
this argument has some facial appeal. But under the First
Amendment, it is the means that matter. Consider prior restraints, which are heavily presumed to be unconstitutional except in extremely limited circumstances: rather than prevent
speech from occurring, the government must wait until after
207
the expression has taken place to take legal action. Even if
the end is the same, the First Amendment restricts the means
the government can take to get to that end.
Only the government is constrained by the First Amendment, not the private corporation who owns the platform—and
205. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (“Surely the State has no right to cleanse public
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish
among us. . . . [O]ne man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”).
206. See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
207. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (declaring
that “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (finding the statute in question to be an unconstitutional
prior restraint and an infringement on the freedom of the press).
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this distinction is crucial. Facebook’s standards of removal are
part of the terms and conditions to which every person who
208
creates a Facebook account agrees. Even if a user’s comment
on a government page does violate Facebook’s Community
Standards, the user entered into the agreement with Facebook—not the government. Thus, the risk of removal by Facebook on a government page is no different than on any other
page on the platform. Additionally, social media companies
such as Facebook and Twitter do not simply remove comments
on their own accord; the post must be reported to Facebook by a
third party, and verified to violate a Community Standard.
This is an arguably more objective process than a government
removing speech it considers “abusive” from its own page, especially if that speech happens to be critical of the government.
Next, consider a few hypotheticals. This Note contends
that government entities on social media must take the bitter
with the sweet; that is, when the government creates a page to
connect with constituents, it opens itself up to all public expression, not just those comments it wishes to portray. But
what if the government was not intending to connect with constituents at all, but simply to convey information? One might
imagine a scenario where the government joined Facebook to
broadcast its message to users who were already on the platform, but did not wish to open up a dialogue in the comments
section. As such, the argument might go, the page should be
considered entirely government speech since the government
only intended to convey messages, not to solicit comments from
users.
This theory presents a particularly unworkable regime of
government censorship of online speech. Here, the amount of
protection provided to comments would depend not only on the
government’s subjective intention for the expression it intended
to create, but also the expression it intended to receive—the
platform’s commenting functionalities notwithstanding. It is
difficult to see how a court could determine this intent short of
simply taking the government at its word in every case. The
feasibility of this standard aside, such an analysis would force
courts to perform a factual inquiry in each case of contested
speech on a government page, leading to the same problems
with predictability that governments and commenters currently face.

208. See Community Standards, supra note 198.
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To resolve this issue, this Note instead proposes a bright
line rule: when a government claims part of a pre-existing
space as its own, such as a page on a social media platform,
courts should look to the expressive nature of the space as a
whole, not to the government’s intention for an individual page.
This standard would promote greater predictability, less subjectivity, and would remove the need for an individualized factual inquiry after a forum has been initially established. If a
government chose to commandeer a space for itself on a forum
that is intended to promote expressive activities, such as a social media platform, the resulting government page should also
be considered to promote expressive activity regardless of the
government’s subjective intention.
A more complex issue arises if a government did own the
social media forum and created its own page. In this case, there
is no third party to provide baseline comment moderation. This
Note maintains that the government should be at the mercy of
the page it created; that is, if the government created an open
comment section on its page, it clearly solicits private speech
and should be considered a designated open forum. Does this
change if the government implemented a written comment policy similar to Facebook and Twitter? In this scenario, the government may have a stronger interest in preventing the comments on its page from becoming a “cesspool” of potential
threats, fighting words, or defamation. However, this Note contends that the recourse in these cases is not government censorship; rather, the injured party may take appropriate legal
action against the speaker. The Supreme Court has recognized
that these kinds of speech are not protected under the First
Amendment, and the fact that the speech occurs in a public forum does not change this.
This remedy is better suited to protect private speech
rights. When a government creates a comment policy that allows it to delete “abusive” speech, there is no reliable way to
moderate whether or not it abides by the policy. Faced with
displeasing speech and likely no consequences for removal, the
government would have a perverse incentive to discriminate
against speech on its page based on viewpoint. But even if a
government was dedicated to following its policy by the book,
private speakers are left in a precarious situation. What separates “abusive” speech from online protest speech on an issue of
public concern? Thus, the problems of accountability and predictability remain.

2016]

TWEETING THE POLICE

381

Finally, a government entity may argue that by nature of
existing, some comments interfere with the government’s ability to shape its own message how it wants. Thus, restricting the
government’s ability to remove such a post detracts from the
extensive rights afforded to the main post under the government speech doctrine. This argument has some merit; however,
this is a risk the government takes by expanding to a forum
with open commenting capabilities. For the separable speech
framework to have any meaning, the government speech doctrine cannot be permitted to seep into the public forum comment section. If a government entity is truly concerned that a
comment is affecting its message, it may spread its message
uninterrupted using a static webpage instead of or in addition
to the interactive public forum. Further, if the audience could
not separate between the speakers, then under this Note’s proposed framework the speech would receive intermediate scrutiny under the private-versus-government speech continuum.
CONCLUSION
As the interactions between government entities and private parties continue to move online, the application of the public forum and government speech doctrines to speech in the digital sphere will become increasingly problematic. The flawed
government-versus-private speech dichotomy leaves no room
for multiple speakers to receive separate speech classifications,
even though the design and function of social media sites
makes distinguishing between government and private speakers easier than ever.
Although other commenters have called for replacing the
strict dichotomy with a separate category for contested speech,
this Note proposes that courts should first determine whether
the private and government speech within the forum are sufficiently distinct to receive separate First Amendment protections. If so, courts should treat each category separately—such
as in the case of government-sponsored social media pages,
where the audience can clearly distinguish between a government page owner’s post and a private individual’s comment in
response. The government page owner’s post should receive the
protections afforded under the government speech doctrine,
whereas the comment section should be considered a designated public forum. This new framework affords adequate protection to private speech while respecting the government’s interest in speaking for itself. This is a valuable addition to existing
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scholarship, which calls for a middle category to balance governmental and private speech. The public’s ability to distinguish between speakers in cases of separable speech, as well as
the policy reasons to uphold the marketplace of ideas even for
offensive viewpoints, necessitates removing the harmful government-versus-private speech dichotomy and adding the separable speech test before balancing conflicting speech interests
in the proposed middle category.

